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The paperpresents an account of the scholarly work of Canadiansociologist,
feminist, theorist and activist, Dorothy E. Smith, leading up to her development of institutionalethnographyas "a sociology for people." Drawing
on selected writings, the author discusses some of the major ideas, debates
and practical influences that are part of Smith's scholarly trajectory. The
line of thinking that is illustrated is how her feminism was integral to her
celebrated critique and re-writing of sociological method.
This article introduces some of the theoretical underpinnings
of institutional ethnography, the kind of sociological inquiry that
takes as its problematic people's experiences in the everyday
world. It may seem simply straightforward and logical that a
researcher would be interested in discovering and disclosing how
things happen. And for many who do institutional ethnography,
it has become exactly that. Yet, that goal for research did not just
arise spontaneously. Rather, querying how things happen signals
a particular interest for social researchers, a special focus for
research that Dorothy E. Smith has been working toward across
several decades. This is an entirely different research goal from
making an explanation of events through the application of theory. Smith's approach to research draws on diverse antecedents.
Learning feminism and practising feminism turned out to be
crucial to the critique of sociology that she was making. My goal
in this paper is to show some of the influences that have shaped
Smith's development of institutional ethnography as a sociology
for women and that has become a sociology for people.
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2003, Volume XXX, Number I

4

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

How Smith's scholarly and practical work began to influence
each other will be explored by reviewing important ideas from
some of her writings. But, the purpose of reviewing the roots of
institutional ethnography is not to understand Dorothy Smith as
historiography. We can identify in her theory and methodology
the results of her contesting of the philosophical and sociological
ideas and practices she encountered. Looking back from a position in the 2 1 st century gives us a certain advantage. Now, it is
possible to see how things fit together as an approach with the
name institutional ethnography. Smith's references to, and use
of, as well as arguments with many other scholars throughout
the course of her career help us identify the route along which
she travelled. Although not exhaustive of the ideas that have
been important to her, I have selected some that seem central
to institutional ethnography.'
Besides reviewing its beginnings, this paper also looks briefly
at how institutional ethnography stands with regard to contemporary intellectual debates in the first decade of the 2 1 st century.
Language itself had always held a special interest for Smith and
even prior to attending university, as a young clerical worker
in London she had read philosophy-for pleasure, she says.
Later, she was intrigued by the way that the Oxford philosophers
were writing about "ordinary language" philosophy. She liked
to see how people used words and how words could be made
to "mean." This made literature-novels and poetry-as well
as scholarly commentary on them-influential in Smith's own
thinking and her quest to understand everyday life. Postmodernism and post-structuralism have not passed by unnoticed in
Smith's work and later on I touch briefly on her engagement with
some of these debates. But the linguistic turn in scholarship has
not overwhelmed Smith's thinking partly because attention to
language use was always important to her project of trying to
"write the social" as people live it. Her efforts towards knowing take up Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1953), whom she quotes as
"bring(ing) back words from their metaphysical to their everyday
uses" (Smith, 1999, p. 242). It has been her prevailing interest to
figure out and teach a method of social analysis that is reflexive to
the material contours of people's lives. Some of Foucault's (1970,
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1984) interests in discourse and Bakhtin's (1981, 1986) insistence
on the discourse's local accomplishment appear in Smith's formulations of how sequences of local action are hooked into a
"discourse-driven dialogue" (Smith, 1999:121). She says "truth
and knowledge are grounded in the foundational moments in
which the social comes into being through language and through
the sensory ground that human organisms share" (1999:128).
Feminist Beginnings of a Method of Inquiry
After Smith took her first degree (in social anthropology) at
the London School of Economics she enrolled in a Ph.D. program
in sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. Here she
worked with faculty who were mainly doing and teaching the
conventional positivist sociology prominent in the USA in the
early 1960s. Her thesis supervisor, Erving Goffman, was a notable
exception, Smith says. He made the everyday world visible to
sociology; (indeed, the book that first made his work known
and notable was called The Presentationof Self in Everyday Life).
Goffman invented ways to show what people are doing in their
ordinary interactions. Although Smith did not take up his dramaturgical approach, like him she has never been confined by
sociological convention.
Reflecting on other influences from her graduate education,
she mentions taking a graduate course on George Herbert Mead
that enlarged her thinking about language use. She says that
Mead offered her new ways of "bringing things from the abstract
realm and seeing them more as problems of how people talk
about things." She had had discussions with ethnomethodologists while a student at Berkeley, but it wasn't until later when
she was teaching sociology at the University of British Columbia
beginning in the late 1960s that the real upsurge in non-positivist
sociology occurred. This non-positivist literature found its way
into her own teaching, where Smith employed it to interrogate
such concepts as "deviance" in the social psychology courses
that, as a female faculty member, she was expected to teach.
Her teaching, like her writing, drew from the thinking of Alfred
Schutz and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in phenomenology, George
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Herbert Mead in symbolic interactionism, Harold Garfinkel and
his students in ethnomethodology, as well as Marx and the other
more traditional social theorists.
James Heap, one of her first Ph.D. students at the University
of British Columbia, speaks of how he learned from Smith about
"interpretive procedures.., procedures for knowing, and the
nature of things known" drawn from her engagement with this
set of theorists (Campbell and Manicom, 1995: x). In noting this,
Heap was making the point that it is often forgotten that these
interpretive influences predated Smith's feminism and laid the
basis of her later work. He wants both to be remembered. Yet
here, in this article, a different emphasis is developed and a
different point is being made-that the feminism at the heart of
institutional ethnography is often overlooked or misunderstood.
Smith had always been impressed by the work of Marx (trans.
1954) that she had read in the original while at the LSE. In the 1970s
she would go back to Marx and put his writings together with
her newer thinking, particularly with her feminist concerns and
interests. At first, she was working within a discourse constituted
almost entirely by men. 2 She engaged with their ideas and, where
necessary to her project, debated them from a standpoint made
accessible by the feminism developing in the last half of the 2 0 th
century.
Several of Smith's early articles are especially helpful in understanding her own developing thought. These pieces contain
ideas that stayed important and are increasingly elaborated in
successive lines of inquiry throughout the next decades. Students
then (as now) puzzled over her dense writings as newer ones
kept appearing on her course reading lists. Engagement with her
students' class assignments fuelled Smith's own thinking, as for
example in her article "K is Mentally Ill," an early 1970s piece that
wasn't published in English until 1990. That paper circled back
into continuing discussions with new students throughout the 70s
and 80s. Its data came from a class exercise that asked students
to find and interview someone who could describe someone
else's experience of becoming "mentally ill." From one student's
report, Smith saw the opportunity to interrogate facts and how
factual knowing occurs. What she saw in the interview text was
to be a key element of Smith's thinking, writing and teaching
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on into the next decade-the possibility (and practical necessity,
especially for women) of interrogating taken for granted practices
of knowing. In this early paper she identified the work-up that
the interviewee and student were doing to construct the report.
She identified how selected pieces of experience are relied on to
arrive at a story that anyone could recognize as mental illness.
Smith's argument was that these features of making sense in
ordinary ways are noteworthy in themselves. Pushing them out
into the open, not leaving them buried and disattended makes
visible how people arrive at particular meanings. Of course, as
she illustrates in "K is Mentally Ill," when the work-up is made
visible as people's practices, the authority of the account is unsettled. That move forms a gestalt-with a foreground that shifts to
background when a different frame is used. In this case, discovering the construction work inherent in the story made it almost
impossible for Smith to revert to her former reading. This analysis
was to be massively influential in her developing critique of
sociological method and to her insights about the way that texts
and textual practices are an essential part of the meanings that
they apparently simply carry.
Smith's paper "Women's Perspective as a Radical Critique of
Sociology" was similarly ground-breaking and inspirational to
her contemporary feminist colleagues. Delivered at a conference
in 1972, this paper was passed from hand to hand across North
America before it was published in a sociology journal in 1974
and then reprinted in Sandra Harding's influential Feminism and
Methodology in 1987. The 1970s was the era when women from
various locations in society were identifying conditions in their
lives that chafed and stultified them. Women academics were
bringing these critiques into the academy and into their intellectual work there. Smith's analysis in this particular piece showed
how the conceptualizing of sociology was a male activity, and that
it depended upon certain conditions for its achievement that men,
but not women, could take for granted. For instance, women's
domestic work routinely provided the conditions for men to live
in the head world, their work lives untrammeled by responsibility for managing their mundane daily needs-for food, clean
clothing and a quiet, tidy work space and so on. In contrast, as
was the radical direction of Smith's analysis, women's standpoint
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arose precisely from their bodily connection to knowing. Men's
ideas, Smith claimed, carried authority, even though as she was
showing, their alienation from a firm grounding in the materiality
of everyday life distorted men's understandings. These analytic
observations were the starting point for Smith's work toward a
different sociology for women.
Her dissatisfaction with sociological orthodoxy was the subject of her article, "The Ideological Practice of Sociology."3 This
paper carries Smith's important critique of sociological (and social
science) method, drawing on Marx and Engel's (trans. 1976) critique of German philosophy that he had called "ideology." In this
paper Smith explains how she departs from the distinction that
conventional sociology would make between ideology and social
science, where the notion of ideology is of biased or distorted
statements, while social science is considered to be objectively
truthful. Smith's analysis of ideological practices in social science
focuses on the methodological moves that an intellectual makes to
generate objective knowledge. Specifically, she argued that such
methodological procedures end up cancelling the subjectivity of
the knower so that knowing moves to an abstract conceptual
plane. This, she recognized, was how she had been trained as
a sociologist to understand the world. But now, she was comparing that approach with Marx's premise that (non-ideological)
analysis is an explication of "actual people's activities and the
material conditions thereof" (Smith 1990a:36). Reflecting on her
own training, Smith has written:
Sociology creates a construct of society that is specifically discontinuous with the world known, lived, experienced and acted in.
The practice of sociology in which we were trained as graduate
students was one that insisted that the sociologist should never
go out without a concept; that to encounter the raw world was
to encounter a world of irremediable disorder and confusion; to
even begin to speak sociologically of that world required a concept,
or concepts, to order, select, assemble, a sociological version of the
world on paper." (1990b:2)
From Marx she had learned not to be satisfied with treating the
conceptual as a given-rather to view "concepts and categories as
expressions of social relations and hence as opening up a universe
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for exploration that is 'present' in them but not explicated" (Smith
1990a:37). She claimed that what she called the ideological practices integral to social science had the effect of confining people
who used them to a conceptual level that suppresses the presence
and workings of the underlying relations they express. Making
this critique demanded of Smith that she find another way of
doing sociology, one that would build for all to see an account
of how things work and, in particular, how they work against
women and other oppressed people.
In the 1970s, besides her specifically intellectual work, Smith
was part of a movement of community women who were attempting to understand and change the conditions of their lives.
"Feminism and Marxism" a talk given to women activists in 1977
was published as a monograph in the same year. It presented
in non-academic language her sense of how to work on behalf
of women. She spoke about the distinctiveness of a feminist
position, which for her had developed out of Marxism-out of
turning to Marx's writings for help in understanding how the
relations among and between men and women are organized.
Employing a Marxist framework, she said, was the only way
to discover "something about how the determinations of your
particular space would be seen as arising as aspects of a social
and economic process, of social relations outside it" (1977:12).
So, for Smith, learning to work against women's oppression had
led her not to a feminist theory, but to taking the standpoint of
women in a committed way-a commitment that invoked the
notion of sisterhood so important to the women's movement of
that time (Smith, 1977:14). Sisterhood, as invoked by Smith, was
not a sentimental idea but a way of speaking about the method of
working she was developing. This method required relocation
of the knower-moving from being an outsider in hearing of
women's lives and troubles to "locating yourself on their side
and in their position" (Smith, 1977:15). Later, her methodological
writings advanced her thinking on how to conduct scholarly
research this way.
The 1970s was a busy decade for Smith and her own reflections, written much later, suggest the level of creative activity that
she was involved in:
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The intensity of those times is hard to capture in retrospect. (A
feminist conference presentation) gave me an opportunity to pull
together for presentation to other women the thinking I had been
doing around a number of topics-the attempt to situate a sociology
in a knowledge grounded in women's experience, the nature of the
linkages of the university with other bases of power in the society,
the peculiarities of the way changes occur around us (on the campus
where I worked, one day there would be a grassy lawn, the next there
would be hoardings and a hole in the ground), issues of Canadian
cultural identity and of an independent Canadian sociology, my
rediscovery of Marx, and specific inquiry in sociology.

She continues, explaining how she had benefited from those
experiences:
I had learned from the women's movement that I was not bound
to observe the conventions laid down by men that constricted the
relevances of my thinking. I understood therefore that I could move
from what was going on around me to the world of theory and
back. This lesson as well as these topics went into the making of "a
sociology for women" (Smith, 1987:46).
Reading Smith, especially along side writings by the thinkers
whose work she was reading and requiring students to read
at the time, one can see how she takes up topics, interests and
language from these writers and moves on from them. Like Alfred
Schutz before her, she was interested in multiple perspectives,
and how they emerge. She uses Schutz's own words in pointing
to the significance in sociology of how "we live in a world not
of our own making." It was her conviction however that the
making of the world(s) that people live in, the social organization of those experiences, had to be accounted for in research
and knowledge production to make it useful to women's lives.
From the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, Smith learned how
to make experiencing, including the knower's own experience,
central to research. In her paper "K is Mentally Ill," Smith had
used that insight to explore her own reading of the text as a way of
discovering how it had been put together. Exploring how people
use concepts as if they are self-evident was to remain an important
problematic for Smith. It required a dizzying shift in perception,
where ordinary habits of thinking had to be replaced. Smith talks
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about learning how to think as if she were inside what was
happening, not external to it. This is the kind of thinking that for
Smith makes the sociological notion of micro and macro analysis
of social life obsolete. She recognized that when one knows from
"inside" what is happening, there are no such separations. This
is the notion of "experience" that she works with.
Ethnomethodology and ethnomethodologists have an important place in Smith's intellectual development. The ethnomethodological work of Harold Garfinkel, especially as taken up by
a group of researchers at Santa Barbara, is reflected in institutional ethnography, (e.g., Smith, 1999:232-3; and 1990b:211). Ethnomethodology's foundational concerns include "treating facts
as social accomplishments" (Garfinkel, 1967) and "studying a
member's knowledge of his ordinary affairs ... where that

knowledge is treated by us as part of the same setting that it
also makes orderable (having a recognizable order)" (Garfinkel,
1974:18, in Turner, 1974). Others working in the field talked about
ethnomethodology as being interested in practical reasoning. Its
practitioners aimed to make descriptions of how people worked
at bringing into being those features of ordinary life that tend to
be treated as just there or taken for granted. As Turner (1974:11)
put it, ethnomethodologists explored and wrote about "suicides,
ethnic groups, clear matters of fact and the rest of the furniture
of everyday life" but their goal was to show how those occurrences were accomplished competently and were replicable. Such
things were not to be understood as naturally occurring or objectively real. While Smith brought these views into institutional
ethnography, she lost interest in the direction taken by some
other ethnomethodologists. In Roy Turner's 1974 edited collection Ethnomethodology. Smith was the only woman published with
seventeen male ethnomethodologists. She recalls that the men
were pursuing the problematic of social order that Talcott Parsons
had made central to sociological theory. She, on the other hand,
was always on the lookout for "how things work."
Many ethnomethodologists were not querying the reality constituted by their own practices, just explicating them as members'
methods of accomplishing reality. Smith, on the other hand, insisted that "the sociologist is and must be an active participant
in constructing the events she treats as data" (Smith, 1990a:13). It

12

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

seems apparent as early as 1974, with her rediscovery of Marx,
that Smith was moving in a different direction in her new project
of writing a sociology for women. Unlike the ethnomethodological interest in practical reasoning and its empirical investigation
in everyday sites, Smith didn't want to accept the limitations of a
technique that separated out for analysis an event, a conversation,
or some other practice from its place nested in the lived world of
the subject. Doing so would confine understandings artificially,
she saw, and was therefore not satisfactory to her purpose.
Smith had already come to the conclusion that sociological
analysis should not separate what in the everyday world was
already unified. Following the lead given by Marx's analysis of
the economy of his own time, Smith began to see what it would
take to connect her puzzles in the everyday world to the sort
of dimensions that Marx was talking about. The connections
were there, although they are invisible, as long as they remain
unanalysed and unanalysable. She began to speak about the
local world and extra-local domain or settings. She proposed
that both were part of the social relations of any experienced
actuality. The strategy for bringing them together was through
an analysis that locates the knower (Marx's actual individuals)
whose activities concert what actually happens in time and space.
To make sociology politically committed, she had to overcome its
practices of knowing that "exclude the presence and experience
of particular subjectivities" (1987:2). Smith was putting together
a materialist analysis for sociology that would account for the
subject's presence, for her knowing and doing. And for how
the subject enacted her everyday life in ways that connected her
into relations outside herself and her experiences. This was the
procedure that could lead a researcher into the discovery of extralocal relations and thus to see how the local setting worked.
Phenomenology had opened the possibility of a sociology that
could address people's experiences. Ethnomethodology offered
the specialized way of seeing people's activities as integral to any
account of what was happening. From Marx came the notion of
social relations that makes theoretical sense of Smith's conviction
about the inseparability of micro and macro analysis. Seeing that
people work knowledgeably to concert their action with ruling
regimes puts the possibility of that material connection into the
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analysis. For Smith, the latter is also how the politics of the setting
can be dissected and viewed. No setting is an isolated unit, but
is part of an organized whole. This underpins a strategy for
identifying how power is inserted into (enacted in, actually) the
experiential setting, often in silent and mysterious ways.
Feminism and Smith's Sociology for Women
Feminism was a necessary component for Smith's rethinking of the methods of social analysis that were available in the
1970s. In feminist consciousness-raising Smith found inspiration
for thinking about knowledge as a practical matter and how it
relates to practical experiences. The philosophy of consciousnessraising and its strategies accorded women's voices authority in
feminist circles. Smith's own daily pursuits as a worker, wife
and mother informed her view that women, although precluded
almost entirely from positions of authority, had one trusted source
of knowing from which to speak-their everyday experience.
Smith recognized the validity of women's anger when nowhere
else were they treated as knowledgeable people. That had been
a painful lesson Smith herself learned as a woman, mother and
academic. Entering the academic world as a graduate research
assistant, Smith had identified an uncomfortable rupture between
the responsible person she was as a wife and mother and how
she was expected to know and be as a scholar. At home, as a
mother and wife she engaged in work that related to bodiesfor instance, feeding the family, and bathing and clothing small
children. Ways of knowing that were relevant there, even essential
for giving and supporting life, were not recognized as a legitimate
basis for knowing in the other world. Intellectual work was done
in the head world, as if bodies didn't exist. There seemed to be
a permanent rupture between the two kinds of knowing, not to
mention a different valuing. Addressing the tasks associated with
each seemed to require her to be two different persons. To be
successful in the head world, it was not sufficient or even helpful
to know the world in the ways in which women are authoritative
speakers (Smith, 1990a:28). Just the opposite was true. Smith
"learned" that to conceptualize in the standard scholarly manner
was to repudiate experiential knowing. To work in universities
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and in scholarship she had to suppress the knowledge from her
everyday world, for which, she says, there was at that time no
acceptable language.
As she made headway in developing her notions of knowing from the standpoint of women, her critical analysis of the
practices of theorizing and knowledge generation converged with
her political commitments. To explain what women in the 1970s
were recognizing as their subordination, she argued that women's
exclusion from the positions where society and culture were put
together accounts for how social life is ordered by knowledge
that doesn't fit women's realities. In other words, the world is
not made for women. Acquiring the political stance of a feminist helped Smith recognize that to make knowledge that would
work for women, knowledge practices had to be revamped. In
her "Women's perspective as a radical critique of sociology" she
turned upside down the approach to knowing that required living
in the head world. In describing the traditional gender regime
in which women keep house for men, she pointed out that besides attending to their bodily domestic needs at home, women
perform analogous functions in professional and managerial settings, too. Smith wrote that women "mediate for men at work the
relationship between the conceptual mode of action and the actual
concrete forms" in which their work must get done (1990a:18,19).
With women's help, men are lifted out of the immediate, local
and particular place in which they reside in their bodies and are
allowed to act as if they are living in their heads. The cost is borne
not just by the women who do the background work, but also by
the men themselves. Having their knowing mediated to them by
other people and through their own objectified methods means
that men lose touch with a certain level of reality. Being alienated
from themselves as the knowing subject of their experience is
consequential for what they can know. Men can make, believe in,
and act on objectified accounts of the world that reflect only how it
is known from their alienated place in it. This was also what Smith
had been calling "ideological" about the standard procedures for
doing sociology that she criticized. She saw that "the sociologist
(was) an actual person in an actual concrete setting (who) has
been cancelled in the procedures that objectify and separate him
from his knowledge" (Smith, 1987a:90).
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She and other feminists saw that men work as they do because
women are there to provide for them. In feminist politics, this
insight motivated women to redefine domestic relationships and
try to change the division of domestic labour. In Smith's hands, the
insight was also important theoretically. She contrasted embodied
knowing with abstract conceptual knowledge. Her own theorizing showed how it is possible for men to forget their bodies and
live and act in the conceptual mode in which business, academia
and government are done. It became apparent that while thinking
and working in an ideological manner may have originated with
the men who were in the academy, professions and government
before women were influential there, women can also learn to
operate in the abstract conceptual mode. Indeed to be successful academics, women have had to gain skills in suppressing
their experiential knowledge in favour of objectified knowing.
For that reason, it hasn't helped women much to have more of
them getting ahead in academia. Perhaps the same thing could
be said of women in political life and government or in business
and elsewhere-that women recently have made inroads into
authoritative positions.
Speaking to an audience of women academics in the early
1980s, Smith (1984) made the point that as more and more women
enter academia, they adopt conventional male-defined standards
of scholarly achievement. The standards and conditions of acceptable scholarship have remained more or less as men defined
them through decades of higher learning. In attempting to meet
these standards, women take up the tools of the oppressors. Working ideologically, women scholars contribute to the research that
determines how the world gets framed (ideologically) for those
who live it. Ironically, as authoritative description accumulates
on domestic areas such as the family, marriage, child rearing and
schooling, the areas in which women have always been central,
a contradiction grows. Women's experience of their everyday
worlds of action where they have always been knowledgeable
is ruptured from how their experience gets written about, and
worked up officially. That new knowledge is then used against
them authoritatively, to re-order and manage themselves and
other women. Smith was coming at the problem of ruling and
subordination as a feminist, informed by the emerging feminist
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scholarship of the second wave feminists who had discovered a
history of violent suppression of women's knowledge across the
centuries.
Smith's insight about women's standpoint in experience being a beginning for inquiry was also the key to understanding ruling and domination wherever it occurs. This is how Smith moved
from theorizing women's standpoint to make a radical turn in
sociology, providing a method to investigate how certain forms of
knowing authoritatively replace and undermine other forms. She
had always been interested in documents, documentary realities,
and their part in the constitution of authority and power. By
the 1980s, she was talking about texts and the technologies of
ruling that she argued are specifically knowledge-based. Now
she described the ubiquity of text mediated social organization
as the technology of ruling in late 2 0 th century capitalist societies
(1990b:209-224). In a knowledge-based society, ruling practices,
she argued, rely on authorized versions of knowledge (such as
routinely generated by sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, organization theorists and more recently, the information
management scholars and consultants). If we accept Smith's view,
no longer can we think of ruling being done by powerful others,
somewhere out there, entirely separate from ourselves. We all
take up ruling concepts and activate them as we go about our
daily lives.
Texts, Ruling and Knowing the World from Inside Experience
Knowing in specific ways is integral to many, if not all, forms
of organized action in contemporary society. Organization works
smoothly when people are able to take up pieces of action and
move them along easily and competently. People's knowledge of
how to coordinate their action with others is a required feature of
social life. Such knowledge is routinely counted on and usually
is available as an unquestioned resource. As Smith continually
asserts and illustrates, certain forms of knowing are the basis
for ruling-in management, governing, the professions and so
on. Text mediated ruling practices, Smith argued, subordinate
local knowing, imposing ruling perspectives. Given women's
experiences of being excluded and oppressed, learning how their
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knowledge is undermined and replaced is an important preliminary feature for empowering people. As Smith had discovered,
women's standpoint grounded in their everyday experience offers a challenge to ruling perspectives. She saw this from her
early work on women's oppression and from analysing women's
crucial role in mediating for men their knowledge practices.
In the introduction to her 1990 collection of papers on the
conceptual practices of power, Smith identifies the connections
that she was beginning to make between women's exclusion as
subjects from sociology and questions of women's oppression
throughout history. "At the line of fault along which women's
experience breaks away from the discourses mediated by texts...
a critical standpoint emerges" (1990:11). Smith recognized that
women's standpoint grounded in everyday experiences was the
beginning of different approach to knowing fully and in a trustworthy way. Occasionally in the processes of being ruled or doing
ruling, someone involved has an experience of disjuncture, of
being out of step. When that person's knowing is being subordinated by the organizational practices, this moment of disjuncture
locates a problematic-a latent puzzle. Perhaps the problematic
will be only for that person. Women have had this experience of
being "out of step" in many situations. Smith's whole scholarly
undertaking was inspired from such recognition and her work
benefitted from her discovery of a sense of solidarity and sisterhood with other women in this regard. She recognized that
knowing differently was the basis for changing the conditions
of women's lives. To begin to undermine oppression, one must
be able to identify and challenge the prevailing problems in
otherwise unquestioned, taken-for granted, prevailing ways of
knowing and acting. That is the sort of inquiry that Smith had
wanted to make possible. She imagined that when people begin
to see how they participate in their own and others' oppression by
using the oppressor's language and tools and taking up actions
that are not in their own interests, anti-oppressive work could be
advanced.
The contribution of institutional ethnography was in constructing accounts from the standpoint of those with whom or
for whom the researcher chooses to work. Beginning from people's experience of being ruled, the practices of ruling could be
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explicated in research accounts. This approach to social analysis
insists that "we look at any or all aspects of a society from where we
areactually located,embodied, in the local historicityand particularities
of our lived worlds" (Smith, 1987:8). Researching from a particular
location is one of the most important features of Smith's sociology
for women. Not, of course, confined to inquiry into women's
lives, it assumes a socially organized world where anyone's experience is intimately connected to their work of bringing into
being the world as they live it. It assumes, in contrast to knowing
ideologically, that what anyone knows experientially is always
embodied and a subject always exists in a body that is located in
time and space. Smith's materialist method uses this experiential
basis for building dependable accounts of how things work. That
goal for knowing stands in contrast to constructing ideological
knowledge whose foundation is in theory and the discourses of
ruling institutions.
The tools of Smith's method, specifically her recognition of
the importance of texts, language and discourse in the social organization of people's knowledge of the everyday world, became
a matter of some contention during the last decades of the 2 0 th
century. The linguistic turn in scholarship unsettled established
ways of knowing as scholars in different fields began to recognize
and criticize how the social and its representation were often
treated as isomorphic. Insights of this sort led to claims that nothing could be known outside of discourse. Smith could not leave
this claim unchallenged, as it undermined, she thought, years of
feminist struggle to speak from one's experience-to be heard
as having something to say. One important product of Smith's
engagement with the "developing intellectual debates loosely
described as post-structuralism/postmodernism" appears in her
(1999) article entitled "Telling the Truth after Postmodernism."
Smith begins by noting areas of agreement. Both she and the
theorists whose work she analyses reject the claims of established
sociology to be producing objective accounts of society. But those
theorists derive their critiques from beliefs that differ from Smith's
about the nature of social life and its representation in language.
Smith's longstanding critique of sociology-was of its procedures
for making objective knowledge, that she had argued, objectified
what was known. Those objectifying procedures, Smith claimed,
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seal off new knowledge from the realm of experience and from
what people living the experience know. But this was not the
issue for the post-structuralists and postmodernists whose work
she reviewed. They take a more radical view of the possibility of knowing. She disagreed with their position that she said
"den(ies) that categories and concepts can refer to and represent
a reality beyond them, indeed, that it is meaningful to speak of
a reality which is not in language" (1999:99). Smith claims that
for post-structuralists and postmodernists "there can be ... no

reality posited beyond the text with reference to which meaning
can be stabilized among different subjects" (1999:100). Or as Jane
Flax writes "Truth for postmodernists is an effect of discourse"
(1992, p. 452).
Smith found that in post-structuralist/postmodernist writings, the social-the core of her own theory-had disappeared.
The knowing subject whom Smith insists is an actual person,
located bodily, in time and space, is not there in those accounts.
Agency or causal efficacy, she said, is reassigned by postmodernists to discourse, language, or culture. Smith took seriously
the challenge that this practice presented to the very possibility
of inquiry. She could not agree with those who suggest that "when
we speak and write, the discourse speaks though us" (Smith,
1999:102). In "Telling the Truth after Postmodernism" she argues
that people make meaning together and she illustrates this with
examples. She relies on a similar dialogic approach in making
an account faithful to the world of which it speaks. This kind
of "truth-telling" occurs when what is known emerges out of
"divergent perspectives coordinated in the social act of referring"
(1999:128) to something seen, touched or otherwise discovered.
Smith's reliance on dialogue appears again in her metaphor of a
map as the project of institutional ethnography. She says that the
map (metaphor)
directs us to a form of knowledge of the social that shows relations
between various and differentiated local sites of experience without
subsuming or displacing them. Such a sociology develops from
inquiry and not from theorizing; it aims at discoveries enabling
us to locate ourselves in the complex relations with others arising
from and determining our lives; its capacity to tell the truth is
never contained in the text but arises in the map-reader's dialogic of
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finding and recognizing in the world what the text, itself a product
of such inquiry, tells her she might look for. (1999:130)
Conclusion

In 2003, Dorothy Smith continues to write, teach and refine her
approach to doing a sociology for people. Her four books (Smith,
1987, 1990a and b, and 1999) document her work and explicate its
principles and aims. Many students from different backgrounds
and part of varying struggles have taken up her method and are
adding to it.4 As the introduction to Campbell and Manicom's
(1995) collection of her students' work noted, this diversity of
interest creates "a kind of laboratory where research problems
arise and must be solved, discoveries are made, limitations are
confronted, and possibilities explored" (p. 6). The knowledge that
results from such exploration, the map of the social relations that
constitute it as it is experienced, is there to be acted upon by
those who are building a more socially just world. The terrain
to be mapped is always in motion. That is the challenge for
those who would know it, analytically. And Smith's theory and
methodology are designed to permit this kind of discovery. Institutional ethnographers explore how puzzles they are interested
in are brought into being within the always shifting and changing
relations of ruling that are specific to a time and place. Explication
of how actual people put together the world also shows how it can
be acted upon. In Smith's (1999:95) own words, although "some
of the work of inquiry must be technical, as making a map is, its
product could be ordinarily accessible and usable, just as a map is.
Notes
1. Although I discussed this project with Dorothy, and she generously commented on a draft, I take responsibility for the interpretation of her work
presented here and for its possible errors.
2. One important exception was Jessie Bernard's important book, Academic
Women, published in 1964. She speaks of her debt to her women colleagues
in the first Women's Studies courses taught at UBC in the early 1970s-Helga
Jacobson, Meredith Kimball, Annette Kolodny-and to academic friends
such as Arlene Kaplan Daniels at Northwestern University, as well as to
the women and men who were her students.
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3. She presented it to several audiences of sociologists in 1972 and it appeared
in print twice in 1974, in the journal Catalyst, and excerpted in a collection of
ethnomethodology papers edited by Roy Turner.
4. For recent examples, see the Special Issue of Studies in Cultures, Organizations and Societies, 7 (2), 2001, guest edited by Dorothy Smith and Stephan
Dobson; also see, among others, DeVault, 1999, DeVault and McCoy, in
Gubrium and Holstein (eds), 2002, Campbell and Gregor, 2002. Diamond,
1992, Ng, 1996, G.W. Smith, 1990.
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